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Are business associations - private, formal, nonprofit organizations designed to promote
the common interests of their members - positive or negative for the economy and overall
welfare? Scholars from institutional and organizational economics, on the one side, and
from industrial organization, law & economics, and public choice, on the other side, have
given different answers to this question, which is instrumental for policy making. We con-
struct a model that endogenizes association membership of firms and the main functions
of associations, which can have positive or negative spillovers on the economy. We derive
predictions regarding associations’ functions and their net welfare effects, depending on the
level of property rights securitization, which are in line with empirical observations.
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1 Introduction
Since at least one thousand years, business firms and other professionals have joined forces to
supply public goods that benefit everyone in the industry, to decrease common economic and
political risks, and to increase the profitability of their individual ventures. Often the vehicles for
such cooperation have been formal, member-owned organizations that are designed to promote
the common business interests of their members but that do not pursue profit-maximization
goals independent of their members (Pyle, 2005, 2006). Trade, business, or industry associ-
ations, professional clubs, trade unions, chambers of commerce, academic societies, industry
trade groups, standard setting organizations and medieval guilds are all shapes of the same
generic organizational form, which we call an association in this paper.1
During the Commercial Revolution, which started in the tenth and eleventh centuries in
Europe, the primary function of the first merchant guilds was to protect the property rights
of their members vis-a-vis nonmembers (Volckart and Mangels, 1999). Associations have other
purposes, too. Grafe and Gelderblom (2010:481) categorize the functions of merchant guilds
and other associations as, “(1) guilds’ protection of merchants from predatory rulers, (2) their
deterrence of cheating by merchants, (3) their enabling of firms to extract monopoly rents, and
(4) their ability to balance supply and demand in markets of limited size.” Crucially, whereas
we can expect that all of these functions benefit association members as long as membership is
voluntary, the spillover effects onto nonmembers are ambiguous. The understanding and eval-
uation of such externalities, however, is important for policy makers’ decision making: whether
to promote associations (for instance by awarding tax breaks due to associations’ nonprofit
status), whether not to interfere in industries that are privately managed by associations (for
instance, diamond trading; see Bernstein, 1992), or whether to tax or even prohibit certain
functions of associations (for instance, cartelization of industries.)
Despite the need for unambiguous advice, scholars from law, economics, management, and
political science have come to very different conclusions regarding the impact of associations
on overall efficiency and welfare. The theoretical literature has mostly focused on the negative
side of associations and has not shed light yet as to under which situations we may expect
associations to generate positive or negative spillovers.
The large divergence of scholarly views of business associations in the literature suggests
a bundle of research questions. How can we explain that both the positive and the negative
views on associations simultaneously exist in the research community? Are some associations
unambiguously good and others unambiguously bad for total welfare? Or does each of these
organizations have the ability to do both good and bad? Is it possible to delineate the impact
1The existence of associations has been documented in Europe, North Africa, the Near East, Central and
South America, India and China (Ogilvie, 2011).
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factors that let associations tip in one or the other direction depending on the environment they
operate in?
To tackle these questions we construct a game-theoretic model, in which we endogenize the
individual association membership decisions of the business firms in an economy - and thereby
existence of the association in the first place. We also endogenize the main function(s) of the
association. Inspiration for the type of functions we model is delivered by Döner and Schneider
(2000:263), who distinguish between “market-supporting” and “market-complementing” activi-
ties of associations: the first category is attributed to the private provision of public goods, such
as property rights or the rule of law, and the second category - “more club than public goods”
- to horizontal coordination and other rent-seeking activities.
We allow the members of an association to collectively decide about two types of costly
activities: (i) whether the association influences the political reform process to increase the
level of property rights securitization in the economy (good lobbying); and (ii) whether the
association lobbies for rents that exclusively accrue to association members, to the detriment of
non-members (bad lobbying). Good lobbying is characterized by a free-riding problem because
all firms in the economy, not only association members, benefit from more secure property
rights, for instance, in the form of less banditry, safer roads, or a less corrupt bureaucracy, which
allows firms to retain more of their business profits. Bad lobbying, in turn, is characterized by
negative externalities because funds are diverted from the public to the association’s members.
Association members jointly decide whether to invest in one or both lobbying types, or not to
lobby at all. Besides being association members, or not, firms are individual decision makers
who set an effort level to maximize their individual business profits, which are influenced by
the association’s actions. We show that larger firms—or, alternatively, those with larger profit
potential—have higher incentives to join an association than smaller firms.
The key parameter in this model is the level of property rights securitization. We show that
the equilibrium is characterized by three parameter regions: (i) If property rights are rather
insecure (and the cost of good lobbying is not prohibitive), an association endogenously exists
and exclusively lobbies politicians to increase property rights. The intuition is that here the
marginal private benefit from increased property rights is strong enough to overcome the free-
rider problem. (ii) For intermediate levels of property rights securitization, both good and bad
lobbying take place, strengthening each other’s effects by the complementarity explained above.
(iii) If property rights are rather secure, the marginal benefit of further promoting property
rights is small. Here an association only invests in rent-seeking lobbying, which benefits the
largest firms exclusively.
Moreover, it turns out that good lobbying and bad lobbying are complements: if the associ-
ation lobbies politicians to increase property rights, this has a positive effect on the equilibrium
effort chosen by every firm because it expects to keep a larger share of its gross profits. Higher
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effort levels lead to higher gross profits, which increases the state’s tax revenues. As lobbying
for rents shifts tax revenues to association members, they are more willing to spend on bad
lobbying.
As our model predicts—given a certain, initially exogenous level of property rights securitization—
whether the association will push property rights further, or not, the equilibrium (ex-post) level
of property rights is endogenized. Because in practice the effective level of property rights se-
curitization depends on many factors, such as access to justice, bureaucratic corruption, or the
effectiveness of public enforcement agencies, the model can be interpreted as endogenizing the
quality of legal institutions more broadly.2
Whereas it is clear that the net welfare of associations’ members is always positive (because
in a context of complete information, firms would not become members otherwise), this model
can also shed light on the effects on non-members. We show that the net welfare generated by
associations is positive as long as the level of property rights securitization in an economy is
sufficiently low. This may hold for most countries throughout history and for most developing
economies today. Our model suggests that only the most advanced economies, which are gov-
erned by the rule of law and characterized by highly secure property rights, can be expected to
suffer from the existence of lobbying associations. This is possible because only in these coun-
tries associations focus on rent-seeking activities to a large extent, which benefit their members
but are detrimental for the rest of the economy.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the related literature.
Section 3 describes the model setting. Section 4 presents the equilibrium analysis and results,
whereas Section 5 analyses welfare and efficiency. Section 6 concludes and presents empirical
applications of the model’s results. Appendix A contains a technical discussion and extensions
of the model. Appendix B contains proofs and mathematical derivations of key variables.
2 Business associations and welfare: the costs and benefits of
private ordering
Theoretical literature about the welfare effects of business associations is rather scarce. A nega-
tive view, which is brought forward by scholars from industrial organization, law and economics,
and public choice, underlines the ability of associations to coordinate their members’ behavior,
for instance to publish prices, to allocate quota, and to reduce industry output to the detriment
2Specifically, the loss to business profits and, hence, the state’s tax revenues can be interpreted as corruption
at low levels of the bureaucratic hierarchy, as described by Duvanova: “[H]ere corruption is a set of unpredictable,
arbitrary actions on the part of regulating agencies and other state authorities to extort resources from businesses.
Such corruption operates at the lower levels of bureaucratic hierarchy and might involve, but is not limited to,
‘speed money’—extra unofficial fees for the official services provided by bureaucrats—and bribes and favors
designed to reduce bureaucratic red tape.”
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of consumers (Vives, 1990; Döner and Schneider, 2000; Motta, 2004) or to lobby politicians
for selective favors (Besley and Coate, 2001; Tucker, 2008; Pyle, 2011).3 Probably the best
known theoretical work on associations is Olson’s (1982) study on collective action. He views
associations as aggregations of particular interests. Broad associations are more representative
of the economy, and thus will try to push for reforms that make everyone better off. How-
ever, broad associations often lack the necessary lobbying strength because the interests of their
members are very heterogeneous. Narrow associations that represent particular interests, which
only benefit members, are much more likely to exert influence on rulers because coordination is
easier among few, homogeneous members.
On the other hand, a positive view of associations is assumed by most of the institutional
and organizational economics literature, which underlines the supportive effects of private order-
ing institutions for the transactors involved. In theoretical terms, where non-contractibility or
prohibitive transaction costs make court enforcement of business agreements no available option
for firms, private governance institutions such as information exchanges or arbitration tribunals
that are managed by associations can avoid social dilemma problems that arise through im-
personal exchange.4 This effect reduces the risk of market breakdown and increases the total
amount of efficient business transactions.5
More specifically, Prüfer (2014) analyzes the interaction between a private, formal business
association and an informal social network in a context where mutual cooperation is efficient
but no equilibrium in one-shot interactions. The key parameter, borrowed from Dixit (2003), is
socioeconomic distance between traders. Prüfer shows that traders will only trade with other
transactors if socioeconomic distance between them is small because proximity increases the
probability of future encounters, generating intertemporal incentives to cooperate in the cur-
rent transaction. In that model, associations, which have no or only imperfect access to public
coercion, assume functions of information intermediaries or arbitrators. They are shown to in-
crease the scope of cooperation—and thereby welfare—by coordinating individual punishments
or even exacting damage payments from traders who were found to renege on their contractual
obligations. This result holds even when traders are already connected through an informal so-
cial network. However, the value of association membership decreases if transactors are better
3Along the same line, Olson (2000) stresses that business associations contribute to the uncompetitive, cor-
rupt, and inefficient nature of post-communist economies in Eastern Europe. Bernstein (1992) emphasizes the
ambiguous nature of associations in her study of the modern diamond trading industry.
4See Dixit (2004, 2009), Williamson (2005), and MacLeod (2007) for general overviews of the institutional
and organizational economics approach to private ordering. Greif et al. (1994) study the ability of merchant
guilds to deter state authorities from extracting rents from their members. Masten and Prüfer (2014) offer a
comparative analysis that identifies circumstances where decentralized, informal communities outperform public
courts in supporting contract enforcement among traders.
5The positive effects of private ordering may have been instrumental in getting the Commercial Revolution
going (Greif, 2006) and in facilitating transactions of any scale in developing countries today (Fafchamps, 2004).
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connected informally. This means that, despite the different channels of information transmis-
sion, social networks and associations are substitutes with respect to supporting cooperation.
The results of that model are supported by and explain recent empirical findings, for instance,
that members perceive associations to be less valuable in more competitive industries (Pyle
2005, 2006).
Another welfare enhancing function of associations is to manage collective reputation, when
quality is an issue. Tirole (1996) shows that new members of a group can suffer from the bad
reputation of past members long after they are gone, which creates stereotypes and history
dependence. In order to keep group reputation high, an association can exclude members who
do not cooperate in a transaction. Tirole shows that the threat of exclusion from the association
steers individual behavior and is key to achieve high group reputation.
The idea that associations are created as a response to imperfect public governance is sup-
ported by a vast amount of empirical evidence. Using quantitative data on business associations’
membership as well as qualitative business survey data on twenty five post-communist countries,
Duvanova (2007) finds a strong correlation between firms’ perception of corruption and their
membership in an association.6 Corruption stimulates collective action organized by business
associations and, thus, associations are able to protect firms from predatory state behavior.
Similarly, Pyle (2011) finds, based on survey data about firms and business associations in the
Russian Federation, that collective action organized by associations serves as a substitute for
political competition in securing firms’ property rights:7 “[T]he relationship between a firm’s
membership in a business association and the security of its property rights strengthens in less
politically competitive regions.” This confirms our prediction that the good lobbying role of
associations is particularly important in contexts of low institutional quality. The high value
that this relationship generates for members is reflected by the finding that, in Russia, there is a
strong positive correlation between business association membership and a firm’s propensity to
invest (Frye, 2006). Moreover, when associations lobby political leaders for increased property
rights protection—even if primarily targeting the security of their own members’ businesses—it
has significant positive spillover effects onto the rest of the economy (Döner and Schneider,
2000). Associations also increase members’ joint impact on institutional reform (Lambsdorff,
2002; Acemoglu et al., 2005).
6Duvanova (2007) uses data on firms’ participation in business associations from the European Bank for Re-
construction and Development (EBRD) and the World Bank Business Environment and Enterprise Performance
Survey (BEEPS). BEEPS covers around 4000 firms from different sectors and industries and varying size and
ownership type in twenty five post-communist countries and was conducted in 1999-2000.
7Pyle (2011) conducted two separate surveys in 2003. A screening survey of 1353 firms in seven industrial
sectors, in 48 territorial subjects in Russia; complemented by a more detailed survey of a selected sample of
606 out of the 1353 firms. A different survey was administered to the directors of 200 independent business
associations and used an index of “political competition” from the Democratic Audit of Russia.
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Although the most recent empirical evidence mentioned above comes from Russia and other
transition economies, there is evidence of the positive impact of associations on property rights
protection and economic reform from several developing economies around the world.8 Lucas
(1993) describes how local and sectorial associations in Nigeria strongly opposed the state’s
corruption and the politicization of administration. They achieved an improvement in gov-
ernance that also benefited non-members. A similar case is described by Hewison (1989) for
Thailand, where the effort of associations of ethnic Chinese improved the protection of property
rights, generating positive spillovers on the rest of the economy. Encompassing associations in
Chile, Kuwait, and Mexico were key to successful market-oriented reforms and macroeconomic
stabilization.9 Similarly, in Pakistan, inter-industry associations pushed for the government to
improve infrastructure and solve the problem of severe power shortages.10 Goldsmith (2002)
studies associations in Africa, using qualitative data from a survey to business people and civil
servants in eight African countries, and finds that they have been key in pushing, bargaining and
implementing public policy.11 In particular, Goldsmith tests the hypothesis that associations
are a cure for bad public governance, as they represent the interests of the private sector and
thus provide pluralism in the political process, versus the theory supported by public choice
theorists that associations facilitate rent-seeking. He finds support for the former hypothesis:
associations in Africa are formed primarily in reaction to bad governance.
In between between the two opposed streams of literature, we take a neutral stand. In
the next section we construct a model that first endogenizes association membership and then
allows associations to choose whether to invest in an activity with positive externalities (coined
good lobbying) and an activity characterized by negative externalities (called bad lobbying).
3 Baseline model
Consider an economy populated by a set N = {1, ..., n} of risk neutral firms, with n ≥ 2. Each
firm i ∈ N is characterized by a size parameter ρi ≡ i−1n−1 .12 This definition implies that (i)
firms are ordered by size, such that ρi+1 > ρi for all i, (i+ 1) ∈ N , and (ii) the average size of
firms in the economy is independent of the number of firms, and it is always equal to 1/2.
In a one shot game, firms decide individually how much effort ei to invest in their businesses.
We can interpret ei as the effort to find someone to trade with. Exerting effort costs c(ei), which
8For a detailed summary, see Döner and Schneider (2000).
9Döner and Schneider (2000), p.264-265. The associations mentioned are CPC (Chile), KCCI, (Kuwait), and
CCE (Mexico).
10Tewari (1990), p.310, cited in Nadvi and Schmitz (1994), p.26.
11Goldsmith focuses on Ghana, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Senegal, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia.
12Alternatively, ρi can be interpreted as a measure of potential profitability of the firm.
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with α ∈ [0, 1] an exogenous parameter representing how costly it is to increase operating profits.
Because none of our results depends qualitatively on α, we normalize α = 1.
Expected operating (gross) profits of firm i ∈ N from doing business are denoted by:
πi(ei, ρi, γ) ≡ ei(1 + ρi)γ (2)
where γ denotes the degree of property rights securitization. Firms maximize net profits:
π̃i(ei, ρi, γ, τ) ≡ πi(ei, ρi, γ)(1− τ)− c(ei), (3)
where τ denotes the tax rate.13 Both γ and τ are common knowledge.
Before trade takes place, firms can form a nonprofit association that will have the single
purpose of trying to influence the decisions of the political ruler.14 We assume that this business
association will take decisions collectively, as a single entity, by maximizing the joint profits of
all members.15 Every association member must pay a fee f(ρi) that is endogenously determined
and can be either a flat fee (equal for all members), or increasing in ρi. In the latter case, and for
tractability reasons, we consider a fee scheme f(ρi) that satisfies the following conditions: (i) it
is linear in firm size ρi, (ii) it aligns the incentives of members regarding lobbying decisions, and
(iii) the sum of fees paid by members covers the association’s costs.16 The cost of an association
is composed by the cost of lobbying plus an administrative fixed cost k.
Property rights are imperfectly secured in this economy and, as is visible in (2), firms lose a
share (1−γ) of their operating profits, for instance, through robbery or security-related transac-
tions costs or corruption.17 For simplicity, we assume that the “disappearing” part of operating
profits is lost from a welfare perspective.18 The degree of property rights securitization is com-
mon knowledge and is exogenous to an individual firm. However, a business association can
13Results are qualitatively unchanged if the tax is paid on realized net profits, (πi − c(ei)). In that case,
however, the tax rate τ does not affect the effort decision and becomes a perfect substitute of (1 − γ), thereby
losing some results.
14In Appendix A.1, we argue why the nonprofit form is efficient for associations.
15This is equivalent to majority voting with sincere voters because the individual membership-benefits will be
shown to be monotonic in firm size ρi and, thus, the median voter theorem applies.
16The assumption of joint profit-maximization requires transferable utility among members, which is given here
via differing fees. The assumption of linearity on size is based on the fact that many real-world associations have
a fee structure that is increasing in size. We assume that associations set a fee that aligns members’ incentives
because it is in their own interest that the association is formed and lobbies the ruler, but keeps costs of collective
decision making low (see Hansmann, 1996, Herbst and Prüfer, 2011).
17An alternative interpretation would be that each firm loses all its operating profits with probability 1− γ.
18We show in Appendix A.3 that assuming an arbitrarily small but positive degree of inefficiency in the use of
revenues from illegal activities is enough for our results to hold.
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invest an amount s in lobbying the ruler to increase the level of property rights securitization.19
We refer to this type of lobbying as good lobbying. In particular, good lobbying increases the
level of property rights securitization for all firms to:
γ′ ≡ 1− σ(1− γ) ≥ γ, (4)
with σ ∈ [0, 1].20 Therefore, good lobbying is subject to positive externalities.
The ruler in this economy is an automat that does two things. He is susceptible to lobbying
and he imposes an exogenous tax rate τ over firms’ operating profits. The ruler spends all tax
revenues on public goods such that each firm gets a payoff that is directly proportional to its












i=1 πi(ρi) are total tax revenues and the factor of distribution
2ρi
n is set such that all






Inspired by empirical observations, we also allow the association to exert bad lobbying.
More specifically, the association may invest in lobbying authorities to redistribute tax revenues
towards association members. We assume that, by investing an amount r, all tax revenues are
appropriated by the association. We also refer to this type of lobbying as rent-seeking lobbying.
Revenues from rent-seeking lobbying are divided according to size among the members of the
association.23 Consider the common belief such that the marginal member, who is indifferent
between joining the association or not, is the smallest member of the association. This means
that all traders expect the largest firms to join the association.24 Denoting by î the marginal
19Whether s is spent on activities truthfully informing political decision-makers about how to increase γ or
whether the ruler takes s as a bribe and uses parts of this sum to implement higher γ is irrelevant for this paper.
20We can interpret σ as the (in)efficiency of good lobbying. A high value of σ reflects cases in which the ruler
is not very susceptible to this type of lobbying, or it is too difficult for him to improve the protection of property
rights. Therefore, an investment of s will improve property rights securitization only slightly. On the contrary, a
low level of σ implies that property rights securitization lobbying is very effective, because the ruler is susceptible
to it or because it is easy for the ruler to increase the protection of property rights. Note that the investment of
s has a (positive) decreasing marginal impact on the level of property rights securitization: d(γ
′−γ)
dγ
= σ − 1 ≤ 0.
21In reality, rulers may use a share of tax income to finance their administration and may be biased when
spending tax revenues. We normalize administrative costs to zero and abstract from biases, apart from the effect
of lobbying modeled here, because the direction of possible biases is unclear.
22Note that (5) approaches zero if n is large. Therefore and for tractability of the model, we assume that an
individual firm i neglects the effect of its own effort on the level of total tax revenues when choosing ei but takes
it as given. In Appendix A.4, we discuss how relaxing this assumption affects our results.
23Think of rent-seeking lobbying as an investment to obtain an industry-specific tax cut or an exclusive trade
privilege, which benefits association members but not others. All members benefit from this advantage but large
members can benefit more than small members.
24We show in Appendix A.2 that indeed the largest members join the association in equilibrium, even if the
players hold different beliefs.
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member of the association, a member i ∈ {̂i, î+1, ..., n} of size ρi expects a rent-seeking benefit
of:
2(n− 1)ρi








The above equation ensures that the totality of appropriated tax revenues is distributed
among association members.25 The distribution is directly proportional to members’ size, just
as the utility derived from public goods.
Finally, consider the following timing of the game:26
1. Every firm i ∈ N decides about association membership. Once a firm has joined the
association, it cannot leave it. The membership-fee scheme f(ρi) are determined by the
association.
2. Before deciding about lobbying, non-members can decide to join the association. The
corresponding membership fees, f(ρi), are paid. Association members jointly decide about
lobbying for increased property rights securitization (good lobbying).
3. Every firm i ∈ N individually decides about effort ei at cost c(ei). Firm-specific profits
are realized.
4. Association members jointly decide about lobbying for rent-seeking (bad lobbying). Public
good benefits are realized.
We solve this game by backward induction for a unique subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium.
4 Analysis
At stage 4, association members collectively decide about lobbying for rents (whether or not
to invest a total amount r). Under majority voting, the decision is given by the median voter,
which is equivalent to maximizing the total net benefits from rent-seeking.27 We can express the
total benefits from rent-seeking as the difference between appropriating all tax revenues, and
the proportion of tax revenues that corresponds to association members (in the form of public






26The rationale for this sequence is that the membership body has to be known before the association decides
about its functions, and that firms have to know the level of property rights securitization (γ or γ′) when making
individual business decisions. It can be shown that the results are robust to changes in the timing of effort
decisions and rent-seeking.
27Gains from rent-seeking always have the same sign for all firms. Therefore there is always unanimity among
association members: either they all benefit from rent-seeking or they all lose. The voting rule is not relevant.
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subtracting the cost of bad lobbying from this benefit. The association will exert rent-seeking
if and only if Br ≥ 0, where:












πi(ρi, γ)− r ≥ 0
Substituting πi from equation (2) and rearranging terms, leads to the following condition:
n∑
i=1
ei(ρi)(1 + ρi) ≥ n(n− 1)r
τγ(̂i− 1)(̂i− 2) (7)
To get a clearer result, we need to replace the optimal effort for each firm in the above
condition. Hence, we postpone the intuition of this result until Lemma 1.
At stage 3, every firm i ∈ N decides how much effort ei to exert, at cost c(ei) given by
(1). At the same time, the ruler taxes profits at the rate τ , and property rights are imperfectly
secured. Formally, every i ∈ N solves:
Maxei π̃i = ei(1 + ρi)γ(1− τ)− c(ei)
Given that the second order condition holds, the optimal effort can be derived from the first
order condition:
e∗i = (1 + ρi)γ(1− τ) (8)
Note that the profit-maximizing effort positively depends on the level of property rights
securitization and the size of the firm; and negatively on the tax rate. Because in equilibrium,
individual effort is given by (8), we can replace the optimal effort e∗i in condition (7) that
determines rent-seeking. This leads to a more meaningful condition that has to hold such that

























Here ρ̂ ≡ î−1n−1 is the size of the marginal association member, î. We express the condition for
rent-seeking in terms of ρ̂ instead of î because ρ̂ is normalized in terms of the number of firms.
Hence, we can compare it for different values of n and its interpretation is more intuitive.
Lemma 1 The association exerts rent-seeking lobbying if the marginal member ρ̂ satisfies con-
dition (9), that is, if the marginal member is large enough (and the association is small enough).
Proof: Because Br (̂i, γ) is strictly increasing in î for î ∈ N , Br (̂i, γ) > 0 for all î > {̂i|Br (̂i, γ) =
0}. Moreover, {̂i|Br (̂i, γ) = 0} is unique and it is given by ρ̂r(γ)(n − 1) + 1. Therefore,
Br (̂i, γ) > 0 for any marginal member of size ρ̂ ≥ ρ̂r(γ). The proof is analogous for Br (̂i, γ′).
Q.E.D.
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The larger the size of the marginal member ρ̂ (the fewer members), the more likely it is that
condition (9) holds, ceteris paribus. The reason is that the smaller the association is, the larger
are the joint benefits from rent-seeking and therefore the higher are the incentives to exert bad
lobbying. The higher the cost of rent-seeking (r), the less likely it is that the association decides
to lobby for rents.
Equation (9) also reveals that the likelihood of rent-seeking is higher for values of τ close to
0.5. The intuition comes from the Laffer curve: a high τ reduces the effort of all firms in the
economy and therefore reduces the total size of the pie, decreasing the return of rent-seeking.
On the other hand, a low τ increases the size of the pie, but reduces the slice of the pie that
the government gets and that can be redistributed to the association in case of rent-seeking.
Finally, a higher level of property rights securitization makes it more likely for the association
to extract rents because higher γ increases the returns of firms’ individual effort and thus the
size of tax revenues that can be appropriated by the association.
While equations (3), (2), and (8) may give the impression that τ and (1 − γ) are perfect
substitutes, the result expressed in equation (9) shows they are not. In particular, they have a
different impact on the incentives for the association to exert bad lobbying. The reason for this
result is that the proportion (1−γ) that is expropriated cannot be recovered by the firms, while
the proportion τ that is collected by the ruler via taxes can be recovered by association members
through bad lobbying. Therefore, a higher value of τ is not always bad news for firms, as they
can form an association and lobby the ruler to appropriate the tax revenues (of themselves and
of non-members). We formalize this result in the following Lemma:
Lemma 2 The tax rate τ and the level of property rights securitization γ affect the association’s
incentives to seek rents, captured by ρ̂r(γ) and ρ̂r(γ′), differently.
Proof: Follows directly from computing the derivatives of ρ̂r(γ) and ρ̂r(γ′) with respect to τ
and γ, and noting that they are different. Q.E.D.
At stage 2, association members vote about lobbying for increased property rights protection.
The median voter theorem applies under majority voting because the net individual gain from
lobbying the ruler to improve the protection of property rights is strictly increasing in the size
of the firm.28 According to the median voter theorem, the association decides to lobby for







′), ρi, γ′, τ)− π̃i(e∗i (γ), ρi, γ, τ))− (s+ k) ≥ 0 (10)
Note that we have included the fixed cost k as a cost of good lobbying. The reason is that if
the association only exerts good lobbying, then both s and k are are costs that depend on the
28See equations (2), (3), and (8). Again, because of members’ goal alignment, the voting rule is irrelevant.
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decision of whether to lobby, or not. A firm that is pivotal in decision of exerting good lobbying
only joins the association if both costs are covered.29








2 − (s+ k) ≥ 0. (11)
The following lemma summarizes the necessary and sufficient condition for equation (11) to
hold. Let us define:
ρ̂s ≡ {ρ̂ ∈ [0, 1]|(Bs(̂i) = 0)}. (12)
Lemma 3 The association lobbies to increase property rights securitization if the marginal
member ρ̂ satisfies: ρ̂ ≤ ρ̂s. That is, if the marginal member is small enough (and the association
is large enough).
Proof: See Appendix B.1.
Lemma 3 implies that, everything else equal, an association with a smaller marginal mem-
ber (a larger association) is more likely to exert good lobbying. This is a consequence of the
assumption that all firms benefit from increased property rights securitization, but only associ-
ation members bear the corresponding cost. This generates incentives to free-ride. When a firm
joins the association, the externality from the association to that firm is internalized. There-
fore, the association is more likely to invest in property rights securitization. In other words,
lobbying to increase property rights securitization will occur only if the free-riding incentive is
not overwhelming. This result goes in the opposite direction of what we found for rent-seeking
lobbying. Large associations are more likely to lobby for increased property rights protection,
which boosts profits of all firms in the economy; whereas small associations are more likely to
lobby for rents that exclusively benefit its members, to the detriment of non-members.
So far, we have considered each type of lobbying in isolation. However, there are instances
in which both types of lobbying will occur simultaneously and therefore we need to account for
the interaction between them. There is a two-way complementarity. The first complementarity
comes from the fact that good lobbying increases the level of property rights protection. This
decreases the threshold for rent-seeking from ρ̂r(γ) to ρ̂r(γ′) in condition (9) and thus, makes it
more likely for the association to exert bad lobbying. There is also a more complex complemen-
tarity effect in the other direction: when association members are voting for good lobbying, and
they know that there will be bad lobbying in stage 4, then the relevant net benefits from good
lobbying are not given by equation (11). Instead, they are given by B̃s, which in addition to the
increased profits from doing business depicted in equation (11), include the rise in rent-seeking
29The case in which good and bad lobbying take place is analyzed later.
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benefits due to increased property rights protection (Br(γ′)−Br(γ)). That is:







2 +Br(γ′)−Br(γ)− s. (13)
Let us define:
ρ̃s ≡ {ρ̂ ∈ [0, 1]|B̃s(̂i) = 0}. (14)
Lemma 4 (Complementarity of good and bad lobbying) When association members expect to
exert rent-seeking in stage 4 (that is, if ρ̂ ≥ ρ̂r(γ′)), the association will lobby to increase property
rights securitization at stage 2 if the marginal member ρ̂ satisfies condition ρ̂ ≤ ρ̃s; ρ̃s > ρ̂s.
Proof: Analogous to Lemma 3 and hence, omitted.
Association members can anticipate when the association will exert rent-seeking. In those
cases the relevant threshold marginal member for exerting property rights securitization is given
by (14), which is strictly higher than the value given by (12). Hence, good lobbying is more
likely when there is also bad lobbying. This reflects the complementarity between good and
bad lobbying.
Before we complete our analysis of the functions of business associations, we study how
these self-chosen functions change if the level of property rights securitization changes.
Lemma 5 Good lobbying becomes more profitable for the association when γ increases if γ <
σ
1+σ and less profitable if γ >
σ
1+σ . Bad lobbying becomes ever more profitable with increasing
levels of γ.
Proof: Taking the derivatives of the thresholds for rent-seeking (ρ̂r(γ), ρ̂r(γ′)) and for property
rights securitization (ρ̂s, ρ̃s) with respect to γ shows that ρ̂s and ρ̃s are increasing in γ for




1+σ ≤ 0.5. Increasing ρ̂s and ρ̃s implies that good
lobbying becomes more profitable for the association. In turn, ρ̂r(γ) is decreasing in γ, where
ρ̂r(γ) is the lower bound on ρ̂ such that the association exerts bad lobbying. Q.E.D.
The intuition of Lemma 5 is explained below Proposition 1.
At the beginning of stage 2, before the good lobbying decision is made, non-members can
decide to join the association that has already set the fees. In equilibrium, no firm joins at
this stage, but in order for the equilibrium to exist it is important that this possibility exist.30
Without this possibility, it doesn’t make sense to decide upon a fee scheme when all membership
decisions have already been made.
30In strict terms, in the case of good lobbying, it does not matter when firms join. It may be the case that only
one firm (i = n) joins in the first stage, sets a differentiated fee, and then other firms join in the second stage.
For the sake of simplicity, we consider the equilibrium when all equilibrium members of the association join in
the first stage.
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At stage 1, every firm decides whether to join the association, or not. Subsequently, the
association decides about the fee scheme. There is no asymmetric information and therefore,
firms can anticipate the fee, and lobbying decisions (by majority voting) of the association in
the future. According to Lemma 5, the thresholds for good and bad lobbying change with the
level of property rights protection. Hence, it is possible that for some levels of γ one type of
lobbying is not profitable for the association. We analyze the equilibrium association size for all
the possible cases: an association that exerts only good lobbying, only bad lobbying, or both.
Only good lobbying: If firms expect that the association will exert only good lobbying,
the payoff from joining the association given that the association already exists is equal to
the membership fee, and therefore, negative. Since in this case the payoff from joining the
association is negative, a firm will join an association that only exerts good lobbying if he is
pivotal in the lobbying decision. If s and k are not prohibitive, the marginal member is better
off by joining the association and ensuring its existence than by the original situation without
an association, and a low level of property rights securitization. The marginal non-member,
on the other hand, does not have incentives to join because his membership would not affect
his benefits through increased property rights securitization. Thus, the size of the equilibrium
marginal member in this case is: ρ̂s.
The association can charge either a uniform fee or a differentiated fee that depends on firms’
size. However, if a flat fee is set, an association that only exerts good lobbying is not formed in
equilibrium, under majority voting, even if firms would like to form such an association. This
occurs because the firm that is pivotal in the decision of exerting good lobbying gets a negative
net payoff from good lobbying (the rise in its private profits from increased security is lower than
the uniform membership fee). If the marginal member, ρ̂s, leaves the association, the association
does not exert good lobbying. At equilibrium no association is formed. Consequently, the
association will endogenously set a differentiated fee that is increasing in size when the level of
property rights protection is low. By setting a differentiated fee scheme that satisfies conditions
(i) to (iii) in Section 3, the interests of association members are perfectly aligned because, and
there is unanimity in voting in favor of good lobbying. Thus, the association does not break









24 + 7n(2n− 5)− 13̂i+ 8nî+ 2̂i2
) (15)
Both good and bad lobbying: Consider now the case where an association exists and exerts
both types of lobbying (and therefore, it is possible to free ride on increased property rights
14











′)− f sri , (16)
where the first term on the right hand side is the individual revenue from rent-seeking.31
The term f sri is the membership fee when the association exerts both good and bad lobby-
ing. R(ρi, ρ̂, f
sr
i ) accounts for the net payoff of joining the association and abstracts from the
benefit from increased property rights securitization, which all firms can enjoy independently
of their membership decision.
Recall that according to Lemma 3, the association exerts bad lobbying only if the number
of members is not too large. Hence, this kind of association endogenously sets a flat fee in order
to restrict membership. That is f sri =
r+s+k
n−î+1 . As benefits from bad lobbying are increasing in
firm’s size (as a natural characteristic of sector specific tax cuts, for instance), if the share of
lobbying cost that an individual member has to bear via the membership-fee is independent of
size, small members are put at a disadvantage, relative to the situation with differentiated fees.
In particular, only large firms benefit from joining an association that exerts bad lobbying.
A firm i joins an association that exerts good and bad lobbying if R(ρi, ρ̂, f
sr
i ) ≥ 0. Let us
define ρ̂1(γ) as the size of the marginal member that gains zero from joining the association,
given that he is the marginal member:
ρ̂1 ≡ {ρ ∈ [0, 1]|R(ρ, ρ, f sri ) = 0}. (17)
Only members of size ρi ≥ ρ̂1 are willing to join the association. When ρ̂1 ≥ ρ̂r(γ′),
the equilibrium marginal member is of size ρ̂1. The association favors rent seeking according
to Lemma 3, and non-members do not strategically join the association because they get a
negative payoff from becoming members, that is R(ρj , ρ̂1, f
sr
j ) < 0 for ρj < ρ̂1. If, on the
contrary, ρ̂1 < ρ̂
r(γ′), the equilibrium marginal member’s size cannot be ρ̂1, because according
to Lemma 3 such an association would not exert rent seeking. The equilibrium marginal member
then is of size ρ̂r(γ′). A slightly smaller firm does not join, even though he would like to, because
he would change the lobbying decision of the association.
Only bad lobbying: Similarly, if firms expect that the association will exert only bad lobby-
ing, the association will charge a flat fee equal to f ri =
r+k
n−î+1 . The individual gain from joining





(n− î+ 1)(n+ î− 2)τ
n∑
i=1
πi(ρi, γ)− f ri . (18)
31This means that in case firm i decides not to join the association, the association will be formed anyway, and
will get the revenues from rent-seeking. Therefore, firm i will not get benefits from public goods in case of not
joining the association.
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We define the size of the marginal member that gains zero from joining the association, given
that he is the marginal member, as ρ̂2.
ρ̂2 ≡ {ρ ∈ [0, 1]|R(ρ, ρ, f ri ) = 0}. (19)
The size of the equilibrium marginal member is given by the maximum between ρ̂2 and ρ̂
r(γ)
for the same reasons explained above.
Before formally stating the equilibrium in Proposition 1, we introduce some useful defini-
tions: We define γ1 as the value of γ at which it becomes profitable for association members to
exert rent seeking. For γ > γ1, an association is formed and exerts both types of lobbying:
γ1 ≡ ArgMin{γ ∈ [0, 1]|ρ̂1(γ) = Min{1, ρ̃s(γ)}} (20)
Note that γ1 is such that R(1, 1, f
sr
1 ) = 0. For higher levels of γ, firms gain from joining an
association that exerts both types of lobbying.
Similarly, we define γ2 as the value of γ at which it is not profitable anymore for the
association to exert good lobbying. For γ > γ2, the association will only invest in rent-seeking.
γ2 ≡ ArgMax{γ ∈ [0, 1]|ρ̂r(γ′) = ρ̃s} (21)








where we have included the administrative cost k because for cases in which the association
only exerts good lobbying, a firm will only join the association if the increase in his private
profits covers both the lobbying and the administrative cost.
For a given level of γ, the maximum value of r such that the association invests in bad
lobbying is:
r(γ) =
(14n− 13)(n− 2)γ2(1− τ)τ
6(n− 1) − k. (23)
Finally, we define k as the minimum value of the administrative cost such that an association
is formed and exerts bad lobbying. The intuition behind this bound is not straightforward.
When γ ≥ γ1, if the expected membership fee is lower than the negative externality onto non-
members, small firms may strategically join the association to change the lobbying decision.
This way, they can avoid suffering from the negative externality that rent-seeking imposes on
them. If this is the case, an association is not formed in equilibrium. The lower bound on
k is the minimum value of k such that this practice is too costly for non-members. Thereby,
32The value of s(γ) is calculated by analyzing the incentives to join an association of the smallest firm. That
is, s(γ) is the maximum value of s for which π̃1(γ
′)− π̃1(γ)− fs1 ≥ 0.
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k ≥ k makes the association more exclusive and serves to protect the interests of “sincere”
(rent-seeking) members, where:33
k(γ, f sri ) =
(n− î+ 2)(̂i− 2)(14n− 13)γ′2(1− τ)τ
3(n− 1)2 − s (24)
k(γ, f ri ) =
(n− î+ 2)(̂i− 2)(14n− 13)γ2(1− τ)τ
3(n− 1)2
In this game, a trivial equilibrium is a situation where no association is formed. The following
assumptions constrain the the cost parameters, s, r, and k, such that a non-trivial equilibrium
exists:
Assumption 4.1 (Cost of good lobbying) s ≤ s(γ).
Assumption 4.2 (Cost of bad lobbying) r ≤ r(γ).
Assumption 4.3 (Lower bound administrative cost) k ≥ k(γ).
We summarize our results in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 If one of the following sets of conditions hold, a non-trivial equilibrium exists:
(i) γ < γ1 and Assumption 4.1 is satisfied; (ii) γ1 ≤ γ ≤ γ2 and Assumptions 4.1 to 4.3 hold;
or (iii) γ > γ2 and Assumptions 4.2 and 4.3 hold. In this case, the subgame-perfect Nash
equilibrium is characterized as follows:
1. At stage one, all firms i ∈ N with size ρi ≥ ρ̂∗ join the association and pay the corre-
sponding fee (f si for γ < γ1, f
sr
i for γ1 ≤ γ ≤ γ2, and f ri for γ > γ2). All i ∈ N with size
ρi < ρ̂




ρ̂s if γ < γ1,
Max{ρ̂1, ρ̂r(γ′)} if γ1 ≤ γ ≤ γ2,
Max{ρ̂2, ρ̂r(γ)} if γ > γ2.
2. At stage two, the association lobbies for property rights protection if, and only if, γ ≤ γ2.
In that case, γ increases to γ′.
3. At stage three, every firm i ∈ N exerts effort e∗i at cost c(e∗i ).
4. At stage four, the association lobbies for rents if, and only if, γ ≥ γ1.
Proof: See Appendix B.3.
33In our model k is given. If k was endogenous, the association could limit this strategic behavior of small
firms by increasing the administrative cost k, and consequently, the membership fee fsri . The larger the negative
externality onto non-members, the higher the chosen level of k. By restricting membership, an association that
exerts rent seeking can be formed in equilibrium. On the contrary, an association that only exerts good lobbying
would choose the lowest possible value of k.
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Figure 1: Equilibrium membership and association functions depending on property rights
securitization (example for α = 1, τ = 0.25, σ = 0.6, k = 6, r = 12, s = 4, n = 100).
An association can only exist if its main functions are not prohibitively costly. If those
conditions hold, in equilibrium an association is formed that only exerts good lobbying, for low
levels of γ. For medium levels of γ, an association will exert both types of lobbying, whereas it
will only exert bad lobbying for values of γ close to one. See Figure 1 for a numerical example
illustrating the equilibrium functions and membership-decisions.
Intuitively, the marginal individual gains from good lobbying are high when the level of
property rights protection is low (see equation (4)). These individual gains are increasing in
firm size because the marginal return to effort is higher for larger firms (see equation (2)). On
the contrary, the potential gains from rent-seeking lobbying are low for everybody because most
of the revenues from production are lost due to unsecured property rights, which decreases the
tax revenues that could be appropriated by the association. Because all firms can free-ride
on increased property rights protection, the only way that firms voluntarily decide to join the
association and pay the cost of lobbying is the expectation that the association will not be
formed if they do not join. These expectations are steered by the membership-fee scheme, f si ,
which makes sure that all firms with ρi ≥ ρ̂s know that they are pivotal for the formation
of the association and the joint decision to invest in good lobbying. For smaller firms, the
incentive to free-ride is too strong; they would not join the association even if offered a modest
membership-fee. With increasing γ, but still γ < γ1, the firm size of the marginal member, ρ̂
s,
is also increasing but concave, as is visualized by the bold-printed curve in Figure 1. This is a
reflection of the decreasing marginal returns to good lobbying if property rights get more secure
(equation 4)).
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For intermediate levels of γ, captured by γ1 ≤ γ ≤ γ2 or the dotted curve in Figure 1,
the association exerts both types of lobbying. In this range, the complementarity between the
two types of lobbying is crucial for determining the equilibrium of the game: Good lobbying
increases γ, such that firms can keep a larger share of their business profits. Hence, all firms
choose higher effort levels, which pushes up not only their profits but also total tax revenues.
As these tax revenues can be appropriated by the association via rent-seeking, bad lobbying
becomes profitable. It is interesting that, once γ lies in the intermediate range, many firms
decide not to join the association and, thereby, to leave the gains from rent-seeking to a few
very large firms. This is rational because the value of public goods that is lost to the smaller firms
due to rent-seeking is not exorbitant—but in exchange they can free-ride on the association’s
lobbying to increase property rights protection, which benefits them directly through increased
profits. Note also that there is a kink in the curve that shows the size of the equilibrium
marginal member for γ1 ≤ γ ≤ γ2 in Figure 1. The first part of the curve represents the cases
where ρ̂1 ≥ ρ̂r(γ′), so the equilibrium marginal member is of size ρ̂1. For higher levels of γ,
ρ̂1 < ρ̂
r(γ′), so the equilibrium is then given by ρ̂r(γ′), as explained above.
For high levels of γ, captured by γ > γ2 or the dashed curve in Figure 1, property rights
securitization lobbying is not profitable anymore for the association because of the decreasing
marginal impact of the investment of s. In turn, because very secure property rights lead to a
lot of business activity and tax revenues that can be appropriated by the association, lobbying
for rents is a profitable activity for ever more firms with increasing γ.
5 Welfare and efficiency
Owing to our initial research question, whether associations are rather positive or negative for
the economy, we study the effect of an association’s existence on the welfare of firms, and how
this value changes when the level of property rights securitization γ increases.34
For low levels of property rights securitization, the effects on welfare that are triggered by
the creation of an association are straightforward: For γ < γ1, association members voluntarily
pay the necessary costs (s + k), whereas non-members only benefit from improved property
rights. Consequently, an association that only exerts good lobbying has a positive impact on
both members and non-members’ welfare.
For high levels of property rights securitization (γ > γ2), non-members suffer because the
ruler diverts all public goods to association members. Moreover, members may also suffer from
the existence of the association in this case, because the association makes the rent-seeking
34The players in our game, firms, represent producers and traders of intermediate goods in the economy. We
assume that on average consumers are also better off when firms are better off, for instance, because they own the
firms or are employed by them. Hence, it is sufficient to analyze the welfare effects for members and non-members.
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decision once the administrative cost is sunk and, anticipating this, too many firms join. A
member i has an incentive to join the association, even though he is better off in the absence
of an association, because if r < r the largest firms will form an association anyway, and
the alternative for firm i is to suffer the externality from the association. In summary, at an
aggregate level, the existence of an association is negative for welfare here, for two reasons.
First, rent seeking just shifts tax revenues from non-members to members without having any
positive economic effect. Second, rent seeking costs members (k + r), which constitutes a pure
welfare loss.
The most interesting range of γ, where the welfare effects are less straightforward, is the
intermediate one, where the association exerts both types of lobbying simultaneously (γ1 ≤ γ ≤









where ΔWni is the change in welfare for a non-member i and ΔW
m
i is the change in welfare for











The first term on the right hand side of (26) comes from increased property rights protection;




















− r + s+ k
n− î+ 1 . (27)
The first term on the right-hand side of (27) is due to increased property rights protection;
the second term are gains from rent seeking; the third term is the fee from association mem-
bership. Our main remaining interest is in the decomposition of ΔW : How are members and
non-members differently affected when the level of property rights securitization in the economy
increases? One may think that ΔWmi is non-negative because membership is voluntary. How-
ever, this is not necessarily true. As explained above, members may suffer from the existence
of an association that exerts rent seeking, because too many firms join in equilibrium in order
to avoid the negative externality imposed by this type of lobbying. In particular, the smallest
members are most likely to get a negative payoff because of the existence of the association,
since rent-seeking benefits are increasing in size, and the fee is uniform. We define ρm(γ) as the
size of the member who gains zero from the creation of the association, for a given level of γ.:
ρm(γ) ≡ {ρi|ΔWmi (γ) = 0} (28)
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Similarly, ΔWni may be positive or negative, depending on the profits from increased prop-
erty rights protection and the extent of rent seeking by the association. We define ρn(γ) as the
size of the non-member who gains zero from the creation of the association, for a given level of
γ.:
ρn(γ) ≡ {ρi|ΔWni (γ) = 0.} (29)
By inverting ρn(γ) we obtain γ̂ni , the level of γ at which the effect of the association on
welfare for a non-member firm i is zero:
γ̂ni ≡ {γ|ΔWni = 0.} (30)
Finally, we define γ̂ as the level of property rights protection for which the total welfare
effect of an association that exerts good and bad lobbying, is zero:
γ̂ ≡ {γ|ΔW = 0} (31)
Proposition 2 (Welfare and distribution) Consider the case where γ1 ≤ γ ≤ γ2 and Assump-
tions 4.1 to 4.3 are satisfied. (i) For a given level of γ, the existence of the association negatively
affects the welfare of members of size ρi < ρ
m(γ), and positively affects the welfare of members
of size ρi > ρ
m(γ). The amount of members who are worse-off because the association exists
({i ∈ N |ρ̂1 ≤ ρi < ρm}) increases with γ. (ii) For all γ > γ̂ni and for i > 1, the existence of
the association negatively affects the welfare of non-members (ΔWni (γ) < 0). Analogously, for
γ ≤ γ̂ni , the impact of the association on non-members’ welfare is non-negative (ΔWni (γ) ≥ 0).
For i > 1, γ̂ni < 1. (iii) ΔW
n
i is non-negative for the smallest firm, at i = 1, for any possible
γ, and ΔWni is decreasing in ρi. (iv) For all γ > γ̂, the existence of the association negatively
affects total welfare (ΔW (γ) < 0). Analogously, for γ ≤ γ̂, the impact of the association on
total welfare is non-negative (ΔW (γ) ≥ 0).
Proof: See Appendix B.4.
Proposition 2 (i), (ii) and (iv) imply that members’, non-members’ welfare and total welfare,
respectively, are positively affected by the existence of the association in economies in which
the public protection of property rights is weak. The opposite holds for economies in which
property rights are properly secured. The reason is that for high values of γ the association
invests in rent-seeking. When γ increases, the losses for non-members from rent-seeking also
increase and, simultaneously, the positive spillovers from good lobbying become smaller.
Proposition 2.(iii) reveals the surprising insight that the smallest firms benefit from the exis-
tence of the association even when both good and bad lobbying take place. The intuition is that,
because the utility from public goods is increasing in size, small firms benefit very little from
public goods, and thus do not suffer too much when the association extracts the tax revenues—if
they only benefit from higher individual profits via increased property rights protection. For
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Figure 2: Equilibrium γ̂, ρn and ρm (example for α = 1, τ = 0.25, σ = 0.6, k = 6, r = 12, s =
4, n = 100).
medium-sized firms, however, the negative impact of rent-seeking by the association is larger
and may offset the benefits of increased property rights protection. Hence, ΔWni is negative for
medium-sized firms, and the size of the negative impact increases in γ.35
These insights are illustrated in Figure 2, which is based on the same numerical example
as Figure 1 but zooms into the range where γ1 ≤ γ ≤ γ2, which is studied in Proposition
2. The dashed curve reproduces the equilibrium marginal member ρ̂∗ from Figure 1: above
that curve firms join the association, below the curve firms do not join. The vertical line at
about γ = 0.65 is γ̂: to the left of that line, aggregate net welfare induced by the existence
of the association is positive, to the right of γ̂ it is negative. The surprising distributional
result from Proposition 2.(iii) is illustrated in the range covered by the dotted curve, ρn(γ).
For example, consider γ = 0.7: Small firms (below ρn) do not join the association but benefit
from its existence. Intermediate firms (with ρi ∈ (ρn, ρ̂∗)) do also not join the association but
suffer from its existence in net terms. Large firms (above ρ̂∗) become members, but only firms
of size larger than ρm, the bold-printed curve in Figure 2, are better off after the creation of an
association. Members of size ρ̂∗ ≤ ρi < ρm get a negative net welfare effect from the association.
In terms of efficiency, note that whenever γ > γ̂ the net welfare impact of the association
is negative, which is equivalent to say that the creation of the association is inefficient. Thus,
we have that in equilibrium, an inefficient association will be formed when the ex-ante level of
property rights protection is very high. In addition, we seek to determine whether an association
is formed whenever it is efficient to lobby for increased property rights securitization. Define ŝ
35Section A.5 studies the robustness properties of this result.
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as the highest value of s up to which it is efficient (or, equivalently: welfare enhancing) to invest
in good lobbying. To derive ŝ, we consider the net welfare benefit of good lobbying, equation
(11), when all firms join the association and, therefore, there is no free-riding. Define efficient
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Equation (33) shows that ŝ(γ) is equivalent to s(γ), the maximum level of s such that an
association will exert good lobbying (see (22)). This implies that an association that lobbies to
increase the protection of property rights is formed in equilibrium whenever it is efficient to do
so. This result is a consequence of our perfectly discriminating membership-fee scheme, f(ρi),
which aligns members’ lobbying interests. The membership-fee is structured such that each
firm pays its private gain from increased property rights securitization whenever it is efficient
to create an association that exerts good lobbying (see (18)) and all supposed members are
willing to actually join the association because they know that their contribution is pivotal in
the lobbying decision. The following lemma formalizes this result without needing further proof.
Lemma 6 (Efficiency) ŝ(γ) = s(γ), ∀γ. Hence, an association is formed whenever it is efficient
to exert good lobbying.
6 Discussion, empirical predictions, and conclusions
We have constructed a model that endogenizes the existence, membership, fee scheme and
functions of associations, which can have positive or negative spillovers on the rest of the
economy, and that relates the welfare effects of associations to the institutional environment.
The main hypothesis stemming from this work is that, when property rights are not properly
secured by the state, associations will be formed that focus on trying to increase property
rights protection, thereby solving a free-riding problem among firms. Large firms, who have to
gain a lot from a more secure economy, will be the first to join such an association. This will
increase the welfare of both members and non-members. Only when property rights are rather
secure, and the marginal benefit of further promoting property rights decreases substantially, an
association will focus on rent seeking, which reduces welfare of non-members, and may even hurt
members, compared to the original situation. At an aggregate level, the welfare effects of such
good and bad lobbying are positive up to an intermediate level of property rights securitization.
For higher levels, they turn negative.
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These predictions are widely reflected empirically. There is vast evidence for the positive role
of associations in economies with weak protection of property rights, corruption, and absent or
ineffective public institutions. Döner and Schneider (2000) summarize the results of a series of
case studies, and report that market-supporting activities of associations “are most relevant in
periods of creating and consolidating emerging capitalist economies. [...] In incipient capitalist
economies, enterprises may face basic problems of expropriation and other threats to property
rights. Pressing for stronger property rights is one of the basic functions of most associations,
in part because it is an issue that crosses all cleavages among members.” Their results not only
support the idea that property rights securitization is associations’ most basic function (when
starting at a low level of property rights protection) but also that significant positive spillovers
exist onto the rest of the economy. Only if property rights are somewhat secured, member
firms are better off by letting their association engage in “market-complementing” activities à
la Döner and Schneider (2000), which enable firms to extract monopoly rents. The club good
character of such activities implies that the benefits stemming from rent seeking are restricted
to members and, in contrast, may even be detrimental to the rest of the economy, due to biased
laws and regulations as a result of lobbying and plain deadweight losses as a result of increasing
members’ market power and ability to collude.
An increase in the level of property rights can also be interpreted as a public sector adminis-
trative reform (indicating endogenous institutional quality that depends on private associations’
actions). In Section 2, we refer to several empirical regularities found in developing countries
where associations have been key in organizing collective action in order to push for market-
oriented reforms or a better protection of property rights, thereby benefitting all citizens.
Our main result, the predicted transition from welfare-enhancing to rent-seeking associa-
tions over the course of better protected property rights (or a more effective legal system, more
generally), appears to describe a natural characteristic of organizational and institutional de-
velopment. It is consistent with Adam Smith’s idea that guilds may be useful in one era but
not in another. Pack (1991) quotes student notes from Adam Smith’s course, “Lectures on
Jurisprudence,” dating from the 1760s:36 “For Smith, at one stage in economic development,
certain rules and regulations were evidently necessary to hasten development. However, these
rules and regulations had become obsolete at a later stage of development: ‘Such are monopolies
and all priviledges of corporations, which tho’ they might once be conducive to the interest of the
country are now prejudicial to it. The riches of a country consist in the plenty and cheapness of
provisions, but [the monopolies’ and privileged corporations’] effect is to make every thing dear.’
[LJ(B) 176:472]” (italics added to indicate Smith’s original).37
36We thank Barry Weingast for drawing our attention to Smith’s respective work.
37Smith goes on by underlining the time-dependence of optimal regulatory policies. Importantly, he acknowl-
edges that the direction is from allowing firms to collude at initial stages of market development towards the
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A remarkable illustration of the applicability of our model is provided by Puga and Trefler’s
(2012) case study of medieval Venice (800-1350 AD). They show that the profits from long-
distance trade made during the Commercial Revolution in the 11th and 12th centuries served
as an initially exogenous, positive shock for the Venetian merchant community. The merchants
used the political influence that resulted from their new riches to lobby for political and legal
reforms, for instance, to tighten constraints on the executive and to establish new contracting
institutions. These changes significantly improved the security in long-distance trade and ben-
efited all merchants. However, when a group of very rich merchants evolved around 1300 AD,
they started using their resources to reduce political and economic competition, generating neg-
ative spillovers for the rest of the economy. This time dimension, again from positive spillovers
to negative spillovers, is consistent with the predictions of our model. We can interpret the
initial wealth increase as a shock that made the cost of (good) lobbying nonprohibitive (at least
for large merchants), and thus made collective action to increase the protection of property
rights affordable. When further security improvements became less profitable, rich merchants
focused on extracting rents from the economy and abusing their market and political powers.
Moving to modern associations in emerging economies, Pyle (2011) finds that business as-
sociations serve as a substitute for political competition in securing property rights of firms in
Russia. We argue that the index of political competition used by Pyle is positively correlated
with the level of property rights securitization modeled in this paper, a point that is in line
with Olson (1993:571), who writes: “Democratic political competition, even when it works very
badly, does not give the leader of the government the incentive that an autocrat has to extract
the maximum attainable social surplus.” Consequently, the model presented here can be used
to predict that in polities with little political competition the main function of associations
is the protection of their members’ property rights, which benefits other citizens too, because
of positive spillovers. The more politically competitive a polity becomes, the less pronounced
is the property rights-securitization function and the more important is the rent-seeking func-
tion of associative lobbying. This insight explains and specifies Olson (1993, 2000), who links
democracy to the rise of special interests that ultimately subvert property rights.
necessity to restrict such collusive associations at later stages, not vice versa: “To bring about therefore the sep-
aration of trades sooner than the progress of society would naturally effect, and prevent the uncertainty of all
those who had taken themselves to one trade, it was found necessary to give them a certainty of a comfortable
subsistence. And for this purpose the legislature determined that they should have the priviledge of exercising
their seperate trades without the fear of being cut out of their livelyhood by the increase of their rivalls. That
this was necessary therefore in the 1st stages of the arts to bring them to their proper perfection, appears very
reasonable and is confirmed by this, that it has been the generall practise of all the nations in Europe. But as
this end is now fully answered, it were much to (be) wished that these as well as many other remains of the old
jurisprudence should be removed.” Rephrased in the terms of our model, associations of competitors can have
positive net effects initially but later the negative effects of collusion overwhelm.
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Our paper also offers a possible answer for another issue raised by Pyle (2011:27): “It is less
than clear why we would not observe higher membership rates in associations if indeed they
offer services that secure property rights.”We can explain relatively low association membership
in contexts of weak property rights protection with free-riding of small firms. They benefit from
increased property rights protection but have no incentives to join associations and bear a
share of the their costs. Prüfer (2014) provides an alternative explanation for this puzzle.38 An
empirical test could be able to establish which explanation fits the facts better by looking at
what kind of firms join associations. If large firms join (first), the explanation provided in this
paper may deliver a good explanation; while if it is the smaller firms that join, then Prüfer’s
(2014) reasoning, that less connected firms benefit more from association membership, may be
more appropriate.39
Besides the conjectured “natural” organizational development of associations and the types
of firms with highest incentives to become members, we provide a theoretical rationale for the
empirical observation of differentiated membership-fees. Many real-world associations charge
differentiated fees that typically depend on firms’ profits, revenues, or other measures of their
size. Large member firms pay higher fees than small members.40 In our model, when associations
are free to choose between a flat fee and a differentiated fee, they will endogenously choose
to charge a discriminating fee that is increasing in firms’ size if the association only exerts
good lobbying. This fee structure is efficient because it sustains an equilibrium that increases
overall welfare. Thus, our research indicates that not only justice or equality concerns, but also
efficiency reasons, can explain why we observe differentiated fees in real-world associations.
On the contrary, we show that an association that exerts rent seeking has incentives to
set uniform fees and to artificially increase its administrative costs in order to exclude smaller
firms. In our model, a rise in k increases the membership-fee, which in some cases can deter
38He suggests that in a situation with multiple membership equilibria, certain beliefs could trap an association
in a low membership equilibrium.
39Some preliminary evidence in this regard may favor the hypothesis of the paper at hand: Golikova (2007)
finds from recent survey evidence that larger Russian firms are more apt to be members of an association. In the
UK, Bennet (1998) finds that larger companies generally join more associations than small ones. Bernstein (1996)
provides a different rationale why large firms may benefit more from joining an association—however, in a context
where associations enforce a private legal system and act as arbitrators rather than lobbying policy makers. In
her case study of the NGFA (National Grain and Feed Association), Bernstein shows that the codification of the
industry’s customary norms of trade by the NGFA and the lack of enforcement of unwritten customs reduces
firms’ internal agency costs. This effect is more significant for large firms operating in geographically dispersed
markets, since the unwritten customs may substantially vary from one to another region.
40For example, German chambers of commerce charge fee that positively depend on accounting profits
(https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Industrie-_und_Handelskammer#Beitr.C3.A4ge), the Texas cotton associa-
tion, charges a fee that is increasing in production (http://www.tca-cotton.org/search), and the International
Cotton Association charges a fee that is increasing in the amount of goods traded (http://www.ica-ltd.org/
join-the-ica).
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smaller firms from joining the association and voting against rent-seeking. Hence, a higher
administration cost k may alter the equilibrium, by making the formation of a pure rent-
seeking association feasible. This implies that large firms preferring a rent-seeking association
have incentives to let the association invest in further functions that do not provide (much)
direct value to members, for instance, luxury club goods, but artificially increase membership-
fees. Think of extravagant club houses or conference dinners. Similarly, if an association that
exerts bad lobbying can endogenously set the fee, it will set a uniform fee to restrict membership
of small firms.41
Taking these two insights together creates another testable hypothesis: If an association
is free to choose its membership-fee scheme and opts for a uniform fee (or a scheme that
depends only modestly on member characteristics), our model predicts that this association may
artificially restrict entrance of certain potential members, which can be seen as an indication of
(planned) rent-seeking activities that only benefit the exclusive group of members—despite the
apparent “fairness” concerns that a uniform fee scheme may appeal to, at first sight. In turn, if
an association chooses fees that strongly depend on members’ individual business characteristics,
especially on some proxy for profits, this may not be an indication for “unfair” discriminatory
practices but a tool that improves goal alignment among members and, thereby, increases total
membership if the association’s main function has positive spillovers on the economy.
Concluding, the evidence presented above, together with our model, suggests yet another
reason for the importance of private ordering. If the government were a player in our game
that could actively determine γ, say for a cost, we would need to assume an objective function
for it, typically maximization of total welfare (ignoring all public choice concerns). In such a
model the government would push up γ as long as the marginal welfare gains from increasing
γ would equal its marginal cost. As a consequence, the government would implement the
efficient level of γ—all changes to γ stemming from associational lobbying would necessarily
lead to an overproduction of property rights and, therefore, reduce net welfare. But we are
living in a world where governments are neither necessarily benevolent nor where they have
the power to perfectly tailor institutional quality to the efficient level. Consequently, private
ordering institutions, including associations, even if they are primarily set up for the gain of
their members, may play an important role in shaping the scope and quality of both private
and public institutions, due to the positive externalities they generate.
41In some real-world cases, associations have the right to exclude members according to their own criteria. In
those cases, exclusion of would-be members with different preferences than the incumbent members is possible
even without high, uniform fees.
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Appendix
A Model discussion and extensions
A.1 Lobbying intermediaries as for-profit associations?
The definition of associations used in this paper, taken from Pyle (2005, 2006), includes the fea-
ture that associations are not-for-profit organizations. We include this feature for two reasons.
First, empirically many associations are incorporated as nonprofit organizations. In the U.S.,
for instance, trade associations that meet the requirements of Internal Revenue Code section
501(c)(6) are exempt from federal income tax as business leagues. The same provision extends
exemption to chambers of commerce, real estate boards, boards of trade, and professional foot-
ball leagues (http://www.irs.gov/Charities-&-Non-Profits/Other-Non-Profits/Life-
Cycle-of-a-Business-League-%28Trade-Association%29).
Second, in our model the association always breaks even, after accounting for membership-
fees, but does not produce profits. This implies that any for-profit intermediary who offered
firms to lobby the ruler in their name could only survive in the market if she were significantly
more efficient than the nonprofit association we model above—that her lobbying cost plus
her own required profit would not exceed r (and s). Even then the relationship between the
for-profit intermediary and its customers would be plagued more by information asymmetries,
creating distrust, than the relationship between the nonprofit association manager and her
stakeholders/governing board.
A.2 Off-equilibrium beliefs
All results in the main text were derived under the assumption that firms believe that the largest
firms join an association and the smallest firms are most reluctant to join. Now suppose that
firms hold the belief that it is the smallest firms who will join the association, not the largest
ones. Thus, if the common belief is that all firms i ∈ N of size ρi ≤ ρ̂ join the association,
how do the membership decisions change? We define the function Ro(ρi, ρ̂) as the equivalent to
R(ρi, ρ̂) when the beliefs of firms are such that the smallest firms will join the association (18):








− 2ρi(n− 1)(r + s)
î(̂i− 1) , (A.1)
The net rents from joining the association, Ro, are increasing in ρi. Therefore, if ρ̂
o is
the threshold member size, all ρi ≤ ρ̂o get a negative net benefit Ro(ρi, ρ̂o) from joining, and
thus, will not join the association. It follows that such off-equilibrium beliefs do not support a
profitable deviation from the equilibrium.
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A.3 Inefficiency in the use of resources from illegal activities
In the baseline model, we assume that a proportion (1−γ) of firms’ gross profits disappears from
the economy due to imperfect property rights protection. Strictly speaking, these resources from
illegal activities do not disappear but many inefficiencies are associated with their use.42 In this
subsection we relax the assumption that a proportion (1 − γ) of firms’ production disappears
from the economy, and instead, assume that “thieves” derive a utility of β(1 − γ)∑ni=1 πi(ρi),
with β < 1. The equilibrium remains unchanged, and the welfare analysis differs slightly from
the baseline model. Specifically, the total change in welfare due to the creation of an association



















where the last term represents the change of welfare of “thieves” and is negative: they are worse
off with the formation of an association that exerts good lobbying. However, as long as β < 1, i.e.
as long as their is some inefficiency in the use of resources from illegal activities, the qualitative
results from the baseline model’s welfare section hold. Specifically, ΔW is positive as long as
the association invests in lobbying for improved property rights securitization. Proposition 2
remains unchanged; only the values of γ̂ and γ̂i change.
A.4 Effect of own effort on public goods
If n is small, each firm can significantly affect the level of tax revenues and, thus, the amount of
public goods provided by the ruler, in case no bad lobbying takes place. Since every firm also
derives utility from public goods consumption, this affects the profit-maximizing effort levels.
Taking this effect into account, firms’ objective function (3) can be extended to:
π̃i(ei, ρi) = πi(ei, ρi)(1− τ)− c(ei) + 2τρi
n
⎛





The addition of the final term changes firm i’s equilibrium effort to:
e∗i = (1 + ρi)γ
(




Comparing (A.4) to the equilibrium effort in the baseline model (8) reveals that bad lobbying
now decreases effort of non-member firms, because (1 + ρi)γ
(
1− τ + τ 2ρin
)
> (1 + ρi)γ(1− τ).
However, as long as n is large, any non-member firm i perceives its own impact on tax revenues
as negligible because limn→∞τ 2ρin = 0, an effect we use to simplify the baseline model. There,
non-members can suffer from the association’s rent-seeking but this effect is compensated by the
gain of members, so net welfare only decreases because of the lobbying cost of the association.
42Illegal activities and corruption typically lead to economic waste and inefficiency (Aidt, 2003).
29
However, when individual firms can significantly affect the level of tax revenues (because n
is low), non-members reduce their effort when they foresee that rent-seeking will take place.
At the same time, members of the association will increase their effort in the presence of rent
seeking, because the impact of their own effort on profits is larger when tax revenues are divided
among few firms. Given these two opposed effects on effort, the effect on the total net welfare
generated by associations, ΔW , is ambiguous, and the results of Proposition 2 still apply. For
non-members, however, we can show that the effect of associations on their welfare turns more
negative in small economies (with small n), as long as rent seeking takes place. Given that
in most economies the tax contributions of a specific firm on the level of public goods enjoyed
by that firm are small, however, we perceive that the analysis of our baseline model is a good
approximation for nearly all empirically relevant cases.
A.5 Distributional effects if public good benefits are uniform
The result in Proposition 2.(ii), that medium-sized firms (or large non-members) get the smallest
benefit (or the largest loss) from the existence of an association that does both good and bad
lobbying depends on the assumption that the utility that firms derive from public goods is
increasing in firm size. Instead, if all firms derive the same utility from public goods, then
the smallest firms lose the most due to the association’s actions. To show this formally, we
define ΔW̃ni , the equivalent of (26), as the change in welfare of non-members that is due to













The change of welfare for the smallest firm, denoted by ΔW̃ni=1, is negative for any value
of γ, meaning that the smallest firm is always damaged by the existence of an association that
exerts good and bad lobbying in this case. Let us define:
γ̃i ≡ {γ|ΔW̃ni = 0} (A.6)
Lemma A.1 (i) In general ΔW̃ni is increasing in ρi, and decreasing in γ for:
γ >
3(n− 1)(1 + ρi)2(1− σ)σ(1− τ)
3(n− 1)(1 + ρi)2(1− σ2) + τ(11n− 10− 6ρi(n− 1)− 3ρ2i (n− 1) + 3(n− 1)(1 + ρi)2σ2)
.
(ii) For γ > γ̃i, ΔW̃
n
i (γ) < 0; and for γ ≤ γ̃i, we have that ΔW̃ni (γ) ≥ 0. (iii) We prove that
γ̃i < 1 for all i ∈ N .
Proof: (i) follows directly from taking the derivative of ΔW̃ni with respect to ρi and γ respec-
tively. The proof of (ii) is analogous to Proposition 2. To prove (iii), we first look at the case
where σ = 0. Then:
γ̃i =
√
3(n− 1)(1− τ)(1 + ρi)2wi
(





wi ≡ −3 + 3n+ 16τ − 17nτ + 6(n− 1)(1− τ)ρi + 3(n− 1)(1− τ)ρ2i (A.8)
This threshold will be lower than one if (14n− 13)τ > 0. Since this is always true for n > 1,
we can conclude that for all i ∈ N : γ̃i(σ = 0) < 1. Note that σ = 0 means that the property
rights lobbying is very efficient and completely eliminates the possibility of expropriation. The
benefits from good lobbying are maximized, and therefore we expect this to be the case where
ΔW̃ni is maximal. To confirm this intuition, we take the derivative of ΔW̃
n
i with respect to σ,
which turns out to be negative as long as the following condition is satisfied:
(14n− 13)τ
3(n− 1) < (1− τ)(1 + ρi)
2 (A.9)
If condition (A.9) is satisfied, then for any σ > 0: γ̃i(σ) ≤ γ̃i(σ = 0) < 1. Now, if condition
(A.9) is not satisfied, we use the property that ΔW̃ni < (1− τ)(1 + ρi)2 − (14n−13)τ3(n−1) . But then,
the violation of condition (A.9) implies that (1− τ)(1 + ρi)2 − (14n−13)τ3(n−1) < 0. This means that
in these cases, ΔW̃ni is negative for all possible γ, which is equivalent to γ̃i = 0. Q.E.D.
This lemma shows that if all firms derive the same utility from public goods, then the
smallest firms are worse off when an association that exerts both good and bad lobbying is
formed, even if the level of property rights protection is rather low. The welfare of medium size
firms increases in this case, but when γ is sufficiently high, the welfare of medium size firms
also decreases when an association is formed and they do not take part of it. With respect to
the baseline model, in this case the non-member firms which benefit more (or loses less) are
different. The reason is that, when all firms derive the same utility from public goods regardless
of their size, then the damage generated by rent seeking is the same for all non-members, while
the gains from increased property rights securitization are increasing in size. Hence, small firms
do not gain enough from good lobbying to compensate their losses from bad lobbying.
B Proofs
B.1 Proof of Lemma 3




((1−σ(1−γ))2−γ2)(n− î+ 1)(24 + 7n(2n− 5)− 13̂i+ 8nî+ 2̂i
2)
6(n− 1)2 −(s+k) ≥ 0.
(B.1)
Bs is continuous and strictly decreasing in î and, hence, also decreasing in ρ̂ for n ≥ 2.
Furthermore, if s ≤ s(γ), Bs(̂i = 1) > 0 and Bs(̂i = n) < 0. Thus, ρ̂s = {ρ̂|Bs = 0}, is unique,
and for all ρ̂ ≤ ρ̂s it holds that Bs ≥ 0. Q.E.D.
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(γ′2 − γ2)− f si (B.2)
The function G(ρi, ρ̂) represents the net gain of firm i of size ρi from joining an association
that only exerts good lobbying if it joins the association, and does not exert any lobbying if
it does not join. For low levels of property rights protection, a firm only joins the association
if it is pivotal in the decision of exerting good lobbying and G(ρi, ρi) ≥ 0. We define f si as
the differentiated fee that satisfies three conditions: (i) it is linear in size, (ii) it aligns the
incentives of members, and (iii) the sum of fees paid by members covers the association’s costs.
Condition (i) holds if we define f si = (s + k) ∗ (i + a) ∗ b, where the auxiliary variables a and
b are such that conditions (ii) and (iii) are satisfied. Condition (ii) is equivalent to requiring
{ρ̂|(G(ρ̂, ρ̂) = 0)} = ρ̂s. Condition (iii) can be written as: ∑n
i=î
f si = s+k. The unique function








24 + 7n(2n− 5)− 13̂i+ 8nî+ 2̂i2
) (B.3)
B.3 Proof of Proposition 1
We have to show that all three parts of the equilibrium defined at the beginning of Proposition
1, (i) to (iii), hold.
Part (i): Consider the case where γ < γ1 and s ≤ s(γ). First, recall from the proof of Lemma
3 that Bs is decreasing in ρ̂. Thus, if the association is large, it is more likely to exert good
lobbying. If s ≤ s, the smallest firm gets a benefit from increased property rights protection
higher than its corresponding membership-fee. That is G(1, 1) ≥ 0; see (B.2). Therefore, the
smallest firm is willing to join the association and pay the corresponding cost if it knows that
the association would not be formed without its participation. Since G(ρi, ρ̂) is increasing in ρi,
all firms i > 1 are also willing to join the association if they know they are pivotal in the decision
of exerting good lobbying (i.e. if ρi = ρ̂
s). As a consequence, an association will be formed with
ρ̂∗ = ρ̂s and will exert good lobbying. Note that s(γ) is decreasing in γ. Thus, when the level
of property rights securitization increases, it becomes less likely that an association with good
lobbying purpose is formed.
The firm endogenously chooses a differentiated fee, since the non-trivial equilibrium of an
association that only exerts good lobbying may break down under uniform fees and majority
voting. This occurs because the firm that is pivotal in the decision of exerting good lobbying
would get a negative net payoff from good lobbying (the rise in its private profits from increased
security would be lower than the uniform membership fee). If the marginal member, ρ̂s, leaves
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the association, the association does not exert good lobbying. At equilibrium no association
would be formed.
On the other hand, when γ < γ1, the association has no incentives to invest in bad lobbying
because Br is increasing in γ and ρ̂. When γ is low, ρ̂s is low as well, and therefore, the benefits
from rent-seeking are very low (Lemma 5). The association does not vote for rent-seeking unless
its cost is close to zero, which would be captured by part (ii).
Part (ii): Consider the case where γ1 ≤ γ ≤ γ2 and that Assumptions 4.1 to 4.3 hold. At
γ = γ1, we have that ρ̂1(γ) = Min{1, ρ̃s(γ)}. This means that an association that exerts both
types of lobbying becomes feasible. Some large firms have incentives to join the association
because they have a positive net gain from joining. If ρ̂1 ≥ ρ̂r(γ′), the equilibrium is given
by ρ̂1. The reason is that for the firm of size ρ̂1 the net gain from joining the association in
which he is the marginal member, is equal to zero. Thus, that firm has no incentive to leave
the association. On the other hand, any firm smaller than ρ̂1 would get a negative payoff from
joining the association, because R(ρ̂, ρ̂) is increasing in ρ̂. Hence, non-member firms do not
have an incentive to individually deviate and join the association.
If, on the contrary, ρ̂1 < ρ̂
r(γ′), the equilibrium marginal member cannot be ρ̂1. This would
imply that the association is too large, and it is not profitable to exert bad lobbying. In order for
the association to exert bad lobbying, it must be that ρ̂∗ ≥ ρ̂r(γ′) according to Lemma 1. Hence,
when ρ̂1 < ρ̂
r(γ′) the equilibrium is given by ρ̂r(γ′). A member has no incentives to deviate
since he gets a positive net payoff from membership, while some non-members would like to join
but they do not do it because they cannot commit to vote in favor of rent-seeking. They know
that their membership will change the decision of the association with respect to rent-seeking,
and it is not profitable for them to join an association that only exerts good lobbying, so in
equilibrium, they do not join the association. Assumption 4.3 rules out the possibility of small
firms joining the association strategically with the purpose of changing its lobbying decision.
Part (iii): Consider the case where γ > γ2 and Assumptions 4.2 and 4.3 hold. Lemma 4
established that if ρ̂∗ = ρ̂r(γ′) > ρ̃s, it is not optimal for the association to invest in good lobby-
ing. But, as long as ρ̂r(γ) ≤ 1, it is optimal to invest in rent-seeking lobby according to Lemma
1. If ρ̂2 ≥ ρ̂r(γ), analogously to part (ii), the equilibrium is given by the marginal member that
gains zero from joining the association, i.e. ρ̂2 . If ρ̂2 < ρ̂
r(γ), the equilibrium threshold member
size is not ρ̂2, because it would violate Lemma 1. Since R(ρ̂, ρ̂, f
r
i ) is increasing in the relevant
range of ρ̂, R(ρ̂, ρ̂, f ri ) is positive for all ρ̂ > ρ̂2. If ρ̂
∗ = ρ̂r(γ), the marginal member does not
have incentives to leave the association, because he knows that the association will exert rent
seeking anyway, and he gets a positive net payoff from rent seeking (R(ρ̂, ρ̂, f ri ) > 0). On the
other hand, the marginal non-member does not have incentives to join the association, as the
association would cease to exert rent seeking lobby if he joined. Therefore, the equilibrium is
given by ρ̂∗ = ρ̂r(γ).
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For most of the parameter region, it will be the case that for all γ > γ2 : ρ̂2 < ρ̂
r(γ), so
the equilibrium is given by ρ̂r(γ). The intuition is that, when deciding whether to join or not,
trader’ alternative payoff is zero because the association will be formed anyway and therefore
he will not get a payoff from the use of public goods. Therefore, even small traders are willing
to join the association. However, when the association makes the decision of whether to invest
in rent seeking or not, the alternative is to get a proportion of tax revenues through the use
of public goods. Therefore, the association as a whole requires a higher return to be willing to
invest in rent seeking that an individual trader. Because Br is increasing in ρi, the association
will invest in rent seeking for marginal members of large size, larger than the marginal trader
who is willing to join the association. Hence, in equilibrium, some traders would like to join the
association, but they do not do it because they cannot commit to vote in favor of rent seeking,
and their membership will change the decision of the association with respect to rent seeking.
Finally, assumption 4.3 rules out the possibility of small firms joining the association strate-
gically with the purpose of changing its lobbying decision. Q.E.D.
B.4 Proof of Proposition 2
(i) ΔWmi (γ) is strictly increasing in ρi. Hence, for ρi > ρ
m(γ), ΔWmi (γ) > 0, and ΔW
m
j (γ) < 0
for ρi < ρ
m(γ). The amount of members who are worse-off with the association is: {i ∈
N |ρ̂1 ≤ ρi < ρm}. When the equilibrium is given by ρ̂∗ = ρ̂r(γ′), we need to prove that ρm(γ) is
increasing in γ, and because ρ̂r(γ′) is decreasing in γ, it follows that the set {i ∈ N |ρ̂1 ≤ ρi < ρm}
is increasing in γ. To prove that ρm(γ) is increasing in γ, first note that ρm(γ) is the size of
the member for whom ΔWmi (γ) = 0. It is then sufficient to prove that ΔW
m
i (γ) is decreasing
in γ. ΔWmi (γ) is the sum of the payoff from good lobbying, plus the payoff from rent seeking,
minus the fee. Because the equilibrium is given by ρ̂r(γ′), by definition the payoff from rent
seeking minus the fee equals zero, and is thus not affected by γ. The payoff from good lobbying
is decreasing in γ, so it follows that ΔWmi (γ) is decreasing in γ.
To prove that the number of elements in {i ∈ N |ρ̂1 ≤ ρi < ρm} is decreasing in γ when the
equilibrium is given by ρ̂∗ = ρ̂r(γ′), consider the difference between ΔWmi (γ) and R(ρ, ρ, f
s
i r):







This difference is useful to prove that ρm − ρ̂1 is increasing in γ, because ρm is the value of ρi
for which ΔWmi (γ) = 0, while ρ̂1 is the value of ρi for which R(ρi, ρi, f
s
i r) = 0. Note that We
are interested in the cases where ρm > ρ̂1, which is equivalent to ΔW
m
i (γ)−R(ρi, ρi, f si r) < 0,
because both ΔWmi (γ) and R(ρi, ρi, f
s
i r) are increasing in ρ̂. In those cases, the difference in
equation (B.4) increases in absolute terms when γ increases. That is
d(ΔWmi (γ)−R(ρi,ρi,fsi r))
dγ < 0.




(ii) ΔWni (γ) is strictly decreasing in γ for:
γ >
3(i+ n− 2)2(1− σ)σ(1− τ)
3(i+ n− 2)2(1− σ2) + τ(14− 14i− 3i2 − 16n+ 22in− 3n2 + 3(i+ n− 2)2σ2)
and strictly increasing for γ lower than this value.
Moreover, ΔWni (γ = 0) > 0. This implies that γ̂
n
i is the unique value of γ > 0 such that
ΔWni = 0. Since γ̂i is strictly decreasing on i and γ̂
n
i=1 = 1, it follows that γ̂
n
i < 1 for i > 1.
(iii) Take the derivative of ΔWni with respect to ρi, in (26).















− r − s− k. (B.5)
For γ = 0, ΔW > 0 and ΔW is increasing in γ. For γ = 1, ΔW < 0 and ΔW is decreasing
in γ. Moreover, ΔW is continuous onγ and d
2ΔW
dγ2
< 0 for all γ. Hence, there is a unique value
of γ̂ such that ΔW (γ̂) = 0, and γ̂ < 1. Q.E.D.
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